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Turns out he could survive defeat by Grimsby. He weathered losing a crucial European final against a particularly poor Tottenham teams in living memory. He withstood losing at home against West Ham and Wolves, a lowly league position, an unwavering system, undermining some of the club’s most promising academy products, a poor winning percentage, calling the squad the worst the club has ever seen. But there was a single opponent against whom the Portuguese coach was not permitted to tango. If you challenge the sporting director, you had better succeed.

Unfortunately, similar to numerous top-flight right-back in Blackburn’s championship 1994-95 season, the coach took on the executive and appears to have failed. Even the most casual observer can see the irony here: a coach who often railed at his players for failing in one-on-one duels crumbling in the face of the white heat and animal charisma of a the Premier League’s most intimidating sporting directors.

In truth, this whole bruising episode appears to portray the director in a different perspective. Perhaps it might have been easy, given his nine months in a similar role at Southampton, to view him as little more than a functionary in the United exoskeleton: a man whose appointment was due largely to his friendship with ex-colleague Omar Berrada rather than any verifiable talent. How mistaken we all were. In brilliantly outsmarting the club's celebrated manager, as he outmanoeuvred the hapless a previous executive before him, he has proved himself to be among football's strategic masterminds: a strategic mind that the club's mid-table rivals are now justifiably concerned.

A Strategic Conflict Regarding Formation & Philosophy

For example, this was the director , after being involved in the leadership that appointed the 3-4-3 fundamentalist Amorim originally, played a key role in attempting to convince him to abandon his beloved 3-4-3. Naturally, these pleas were resisted. However, such directives hold greater authority when issued by a man of a man the unimpeachable soccer background he possesses, a veteran of three England caps and a role in a title-winning side from 31 years ago.

Perhaps in time he may be persuaded to explain his thought processes publicly. Maybe one day he might be asked why Amorim is walking away with full compensation, with no penalty clause activated. But Jason Wilcox seldom speaks in public, and with very good reason. The true intellectuals in football – individuals such as him – simply operate at a level beyond our own prosaic understanding. If he ever did speak, probably we would perceive would be ultrasonic blips and complex calculations. Wanting is not quite the same as being ready to comprehend it.

An Ultimate Authority Behind the Throne

But of course, by focusing our attention on the sporting director we overlook the true genius behind the club's current leadership. Jason Wilcox is, in reality, simply carrying out the directives of his line manager Sir Jim Ratcliffe, who in private has made very clear his desire for a four-man defense. It is reported, Ratcliffe has also suggested playing Bryan Mbeumo in a wing-back role. Ratcliffe is keen for United to adopt data science and analytics. Per reports, in an executive meeting soon after his minority ownership, he declared that the team's approach of play “will be decided by this group”.

After all, Ratcliffe is a specialist in this technical footballing stuff, leveraging his background in industry and sailing. Most importantly he is incredibly rich, and it is known, the rich are the best of us: more insightful, more wise, strategically brilliant, fundamentally superior. Whom else would you trust to oversee a strategic plan of austerity, the construction of a modern arena that looks a lot like someone’s leftover knitting, the acquisition of a new striker?

A Modern Football Hierarchy: Executives Over Managers

This is a trend we are increasingly seeing in top-tier football. For decades, teams mistakenly delegated major sporting choices to low-level employees such as coaches, scouts – players themselves. Maybe previously possible for an up-and-coming, innovative manager with ideas and energy to go into a club and implement their plan through to completion. Yet how many companies have such individuals set up? How many mass redundancies have they managed? Far preferable to invest the real power where it belongs: the leadership tier, the open-necked shirt brigade, the guys with impressive professional resumes. Better by far to determine the tactics in the boardroom and hire a coach who can tailor their methods accordingly. If coaches were formerly chefs, they are now more like Deliveroo drivers: not really creating the product, but still ultimately answerable if it arrives cold or fails of the box.

In the meantime, a coach's role is increasingly not about crafting the philosophy and more about marketing it: the receptionist on the front desk, the public face for a club they can do little to change. Enzo Maresca leads a team of literal children into the Champions League and wins two medium-sized trophies, and essentially is dismissed for speaking out. A manager at Celtic finds his standing damaged whereas the people who appointed him live to blunder another day.

A Modern Corporate Football: Responsibility for the Coaches

And possibly in a small way this is simply neoliberalism at work: the elevation of a gilded overclass who can never be wrong, whose choices remain untouchable, whose mistakes can always be resolved by sacking without justification. Hire the system coach only to fire them for using excessively 3-4-3. Bring in the process guy and later bin them for requiring too long. And most importantly be grateful; for the incremental season ticket price rises, for the latest player acquisitions, for the reality that the grownups – regardless of their expertise – are in charge.